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1. Introduction
    This paper is about geometrical shapes and our knowledge of them. My interest 
in this subject comes from my work on the ontology and epistemology of linguistic 
types and tokens (Iida 2009). We see the linguistic entities like alphabets and Chinese  
characters in two different ways. Usually we see them as types, but sometimes we see  
them as  tokens.  I  think it  a  very significant  fact  that  linguistic  entities  sometimes 
appear as abstract entities in the form of types, and they sometimes appear as concrete 
objects  or  events  in  the  form of  tokens.  For,  our  recognition  and  handling of  the 
linguistic  entities  show that  we  have  a  capacity  to  recognize  and  handle  abstract  
entities in concrete situations.
    In trying to account how we recognize an abstract type in a concrete token, I have 
found Ohmori Shōzō's work on the philosophy of sense perception very helpful. His 
account of the perception of a material object has helped me to get a clearer picture of 
the relation between a type and its tokens.
    This experience encouraged me to extend Ohmori's  account further. It  is not 
difficult to realize that linguistic characters are after all geometrical shapes. Hence, it  
seems natural  to see whether  my Ohmori-like account of linguistic  entities  can be 
extended to geometrical shapes in general. 
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2. Ohmori Shōzō 's philosophy of perception
   Ohmori Shōzō (1921--1997) was a leading figure in the postwar Japanese analytic 
philosophy. In the 150 year history of modern Japanese philosophy, he was one of the 
very few who thought their own original thoughts independent of the ever-changing 
philosophical fashions, which almost always come from abroad. I was very fortunate 
to have had him as my first teacher in philosophy.
   Throughout his life, Ohmori was much concerned with the philosophical problems 
of sense perception. In an important paper "Mono to Chikaku (Things and Perception)'' 
(reprinted in (Ohmori 1971)),  he set his problem as that  of explaining the relation 
between two languages; one is a language which describes the world as consisting of 
things, and the other is a language which describes the world as being perceived. A 
little later, he gave up speaking of two languages, and tried to integrate two different  
ways of speaking about the world into one language. It  was made possible by his  
insight that the perception of an object is always accompanied by some very closely 
related thoughts. Such a picture of sense perception is presented in his book Mono to 
Kokoro  (Matter  and  Mind)  published  in  1974  (Ohmori  1974).  My description  of 
Ohmori's theory is based on it.
   His starting point  is  the following observation.  When we perceive a  material 
object, we see it as a three-dimensional object that has a back, sides, and an inside,  
even though, strictly speaking, we see only a "surface'' that the object presents to us.  
We may add that a material object is also perceived to be an object that endures in  
time,  even  though  we  seldom watch  it  for  the  entire  period  of  its  existence  and 
sometimes we see it for only an instant. 
   Ohomori  thinks  that,  in  general,  there  are  two modes  in  which  an  object  is 
presented to us. In some cases, an object is presented to us by being perceived as in 
sense perception.  In  another  cases,  an  object  is  presented  to  us  by being thought.  
Ohmori thinks that mathematical objects and purely theoretical objects in physics like 
electrons and protons can be presented to us only by being thought.
   Among the thoughts which present objects to us, there is a special class of thoughts 
which  have  close  ties  with  perceptions.  They typically  figure  in  imagination  and 
remembrance. When we imagine an object, we imagine ourselves to perceive it. When 
we remember an object, we remember having perceived it. In these cases, the object is 
not actually perceived; it is only thought as being perceived or having being perceived. 
What  we  have  in  the  cases  of  imagination  and  remembrance  are  the  thoughts  of 
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possible perceptions or past perceptions.
   Ohmori  claims  that  in  any perception  of  a  material  object  there  are  various 
thoughts of possible perceptions of the same object from different perspectives beside 
the actual perception of its "surface'', and this is the reason why we perceive an object 
as a  three-dimensional  one. In  other  words,  any "surface''  perception of  a material  
object is always accompanied by some thoughts about the possible perceptions of the 
currently unperceived parts of the object.
   Although  Ohmori  does  not  say  it  explicitly,  I  would  like  to  emphasize  the 
following  fact:  when  we  perceive  a  material  object,  in  usual  cases,  we  are  not 
conscious  that  what  is  given  immediately to  us  is  only its  "surface''  seen  from a  
particular  perspective;  we  experience  our  environment  as  consisting  of  the  three-
dimensional objects enduring in time. It needs a conscious effort to realize that what 
we see in the strict sense is only a spatial part of the object facing us and its temporal  
slice at the present. According to our way of talking, if we are looking at an object  
straightaway without any obstacle, we see the whole, not the part, of the object.
3. Ohmori on perceived triangles and thought triangles
   In several places of his writings, Ohmori writes about the nature of geometry and 
our knowledge of space. Here I can consider only a couple of remarks he made about 
our route to geometrical knowledge.
   When we reason about some property of a triangle, we usually draw a triangle on a 
paper  or  a  blackboard.  In  general,  geometrical  figures  like  triangles  seem  to  be 
presented to us through the sense perception of some traits of physical objects like a 
paper and a blackboard. Ohmori says, however, that a geometrical figure itself cannot 
be  perceived.  He  says  that,  in  seeing  a  triangle  drawn  on  a  paper,  we  have  an  
"invisible'' triangle in thought. It must be invisible because it is supposed to consist of 
the lines that have no breadth and the points that have no extension. Of course, we 
cannot see it, because it is invisible. Thus, a geometrical figure like a triangle is never 
presented by sense perception, but presented only by being thought.
   What is the main difference between seeing a material object and looking at a  
figure on a paper in order to solve a geometrical problem? In both cases, we actually  
perceive something in our environment.  In the former case, it  is the surface of the 
object facing us, and in the latter case, it is some traits of the paper or the blackboard. 
The difference is in the accompanying thoughts. In the former, they are the possible 
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perceptions of the object from different perspectives. In the latter, the accompanying 
thoughts are not the thoughts of possible perceptions, but the thoughts of an "invisible'' 
triangle.
    I think this account is fine as far as it goes. But, at the same time I cannot help 
thinking that there is something missing in this account. It might be true that we have 
thoughts of an invisible triangle when we look at a drawing on a paper. However, what 
makes us possible to think such an invisible, and hence immaterial, triangle when we 
perceive a certain material thing? Are there some resemblances between the two? But, 
how is it possible that an immaterial thing resembles a material thing?
   There does not exist a similar problem in the case of the sense perception of a 
material  object.  For,  in that  case,  the accompanying thoughts are those of possible 
perceptions  from different  perspectives,  which  we  can  imagine  easily.  But,  in  the 
geometry case, it is a big mystery how a material thing causes in us a thought about an 
immaterial entity.
   I believe that there is a solution to this problem. In order to explain it, I have to talk 
about our recognition of linguistic entities like letters and speech sounds.
4. Our recognition of linguistic types and tokens
    If we accept Ohmori's account of sense perception, we might notice that there is a 
good analogy between our sense perception of material objects and our recognition of 
linguistic entities like letters and speech sounds.
    Let us consider a child who is reading a simple text in English. If she is really  
reading, then she must be able to recognize each letter in the text when she sees it.  
What is involved in her recognition of a letter? First, she should be able to see a shape 
on the paper. Second, she should be able to judge that the shape is a token of one of the 
letters (in the sense of types) in the alphabet. In order for her to be able to judge the  
shape as a token of a particular letter, say, "a'', she should be able to remember that she 
encountered  some  other  tokens  of  the  same  letter  before  and  know that  she  will  
encounter new tokens of the same letter in the future. 
    We can see a pattern very much similar to Ohmori's account of sense perception.
In the sense perception of a material object, we have (A) an actual perception 
of a surface of the object, and (B) accompanying thoughts of the possible 
perceptions of the object from different perspectives.
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In the recognition of a letter, we have (A) an actual perception of a token of  
the letter, and (B) accompanying thoughts of the possible perceptions of the 
different tokens of the letter.
I would like to make a remark similar to the one I made before about our perception of 
a material object. Namely, when we see a letter, usually we are not conscious of the 
fact that what is immediately given to us is only its particular token; if you are an  
experienced reader, you are not aware of the particular shapes of the letter tokens or 
word  tokens  for  most  of  the  time  when  you  are  reading.  Just  as  we  see   three-
dimensional and enduring objects when we see our environment, we see word types 
and letter types when we read.
   However, there is one big difference between two cases. As we have emphasized 
several times, a material object is three-dimensional in space and endures in time. It is 
a concrete entity that exists at a particular place and time. In contrast to it, a letter as a 
type is an abstract entity; it is not in space nor in time, although its tokens are.
   Despite this difference, I would like to claim that we perceive letter types and word 
types when we read just as we perceive material objects when we see our environment. 
Hence, we perceive abstract entities when we read.
   An abstract entity like a word type or letter type is not immediately given in our  
perception.  It  is  perceived  only  through  its  particular  tokens.  But  then,  a  three-
dimensional material object is not immediately given in our perception, either. It  is 
perceived only through its particular surface. Hence, if we can talk of the perception of 
a material object, we should be able to talk of the perception of a word type or a letter 
type, too.
   You might object that we cannot perceive abstract entities because we cannot have 
any causal contact with entities that do not exist in space and time. It is true that the  
sense perception of a surface of a material object is caused by the material object. But 
it might be the case that causality is only necessary for a successful sense perception. I 
don't  see  any reason  to  suppose  that  causality  is  also  necessary for  the  routes  to 
knowledge other than sense perception. In this connection, it is interesting to note that 
the concept of causality does not play any role in Ohmori's account of perception. On 
the contrary, he explicitly criticized the causal account of sense perception in a paper 
collected in (Ohmori 1971).
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    In both cases the immediate objects of our perceptions are some concrete things 
or events, which we perceive thorough our sense organs. We may suppose that such 
perceptions are causal processes.  The only difference between the two cases is  the 
difference in how the direct objects of our perception relate to the, as it were, mediate  
objects of our perception. In the perception of a material object, the immediate object 
of our perception, that  is,  a surface of the object,  is a physical  part  of its mediate  
object; in the perception of a type, its immediate object which is either some material 
object or event, is a token of the mediate object of the perception. If it is allowed to 
say that in both cases we perceive not only the immediate object of the perception but  
also the mediate objects of perception, then the difference in the nature of the relations 
between the immediate object and the mediate object of perception does not matter.
5. Shapes as type entities
    One answer to the question "What is a triangle?'' is that it is a concept. Although 
this seems to be an obvious answer, there is a serious difficulty. As Ohmori observed, a 
triangle that  appears in geometry consists of the lines without any breadth and the 
points without any extensions. For example, the three vertices where the sides of the 
triangle intersect should consist of a single point which has no extension, which means 
that each of the three sides of the triangle should have no breadth. It follows that the 
concept "triangle'' does not apply to anything that is found in our environment.
    Or, "triangle'' is ambiguous, and are there one predicate which applies only to 
abstract geometrical objects and another predicate which applies to concrete things 
like the figures on a paper or a blackboard? But then, what is the relation between the 
two predicates? There must be some connection between them, otherwise it becomes a 
mystery why we can use geometry in various ways in our life.
    We have already met the same kind of ambiguity; when we talk of linguistic 
entities  like  letters,  words,  or  sentences,  we  usually  talk  of  them  as  types,  but 
sometimes  we  also  talk  of  them as  tokens.  There  is  a  systematic  ambiguity  in  a 
predicate like "is a letter'', "is a word'' or "is a sentence'', which applies to both of types  
and tokens. Should we think the predicate "is a triangle'' is also such a predicate which  
applies to both of types and tokens?
    Moreover, if we take up this idea and regard a geometrical figure like triangle as a 
type,  we  can  borrow  our  account  of  type  recognition  in  order  to  explain  our 
recognition of a geometrical figure. Let me repeat that account of type recognition.
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In the recognition of a letter, we have (A) an actual perception of a token of  
the letter, and (B) accompanying thoughts of the possible perceptions of the 
different tokens of the letter.
If we substitute "letter''  with  "triangle'',  we get an account of our recognition of a 
triangle.
In the recognition of a triangle, we have (A) an actual perception of a token 
of the triangle, and (B) accompanying thoughts of the possible perceptions of 
the different tokens of the triangle.
    We know, however, that present day geometry is much more complex affair than 
it used to be, for example, compared to the time of Kant. We all have heard something  
about non-Euclidean geometry and some of you may have heard Klein's program or 
the Poincaré conjecture in topology. In view of this, our account of geometrical figures 
seems to be too simple-minded to be of any use.
     In spite of such a worry, I believe there are some grounds to think it worthwhile  
to develop an account of geometrical figures along the line I indicated. It is because 
we have, as it were, a  naive conception of geometrical figures which we put in use 
frequently in our everyday transactions. It is an important task in conceptual analysis 
to identify the elements of such a conception of geometrical figures and clarify its 
relation with various developments in modern geometry. And, I believe something like 
the  type-token  distinction  is  at  the  heart  of  our  naive  conception  of  geometrical 
figures.
6. A problem concerning type existence 
    In general, the existence of a type depends on that of its tokens. As the existence  
of tokens is a contingent matter,  the existence of types is also a contingent matter. 
Types are beyond space and time because they are abstract, but they are not beyond 
the worlds. A type which exists in this world may not exist in some other possible 
worlds just because it has no tokens in such worlds. There are also types which are 
merely possible; they do not exist in this world, but they exist in some other possible 
worlds in which they have their tokens. Thus, types are contingent entities.
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    If we accept the present account, a triangle as a geometrical object is a type entity 
whose existence depends on the existence of its tokens. They are physical things like a 
drawing on a paper or a pattern of lights on a screen, and hence are contingent beings. 
It follows that a geometrical object is also a contingent being.
    But, is this right? Triangles do not constitute a single type. There are infinitely 
many types of triangles which are different from each other. There are an equilateral 
triangle,  various  types  of  isosceles  triangles,  right  triangles,  and  those  types  of 
triangles which do not have any particular names. If there are infinitely many of them, 
isn't it certain that there are some types of triangle which have no tokens in our world?  
Then, doesn't it mean that not all the triangles exist and there are some triangles that  
do not exist?
    Or, it may not. Some might argue like this; let us draw a circle with O as the  
center and OA as a radius; take any point P on the half of the circumference which  
ends at  A on one side and consider  the ray l from O that  crosses  this  part  of  the 
circumference at P; then, take any point Q on l and form a triangle OQA; varying P 
and  Q,  you  will  get  an  infinite  number  of  different  triangles.  Thus,  it  might  be  
concluded that the existence of infinitely many different triangles should not preclude 
that each of them has a token in this world.  
    However, this argument is wrong, so I argue. Tokens must be some concrete 
entities. A typical token of a triangle is a visible and/or tangible object, although we 
are going to consider later the tokens of a triangle which are too huge or too small to 
be visible or tangible. It may be something that is made by us like a drawn figure on a  
paper or something that is found in nature. In the latter case, such a natural object 
should have some material characteristics by which we will recognize it as a token of a  
triangle. For a type to exist it is necessary and sufficient that it has a token; it goes 
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without saying that a token should be an actual one and not a merely possible one; a  
type with merely possible tokens is not an actual type but a merely possible type.
    Let us go back to the argument above. It seems to give us a device to generate a  
token for  each  of  the infinitely many triangles.  But,  why do we think this  device 
should work? Are we sure that we will be able to construct  an infinite number of 
tokens that are different from each other in such a way? If we remember that tokens 
should be concrete things, then it is almost obvious that we can do no such thing. All 
we can do is to construct just a small number of different triangles, however hard and 
however long we might try.
    A token of triangle must be something that is constructed by us or recognized by 
us to be a token of a triangle. Given that the human beings do not exist forever and 
even the universe does not exist forever, the tokens of triangles in the entire history of 
our universe are only finitely many.  This  means that  there are  only finitely many 
tokens of triangles and only finitely many different triangles have a token.
   Now we have the following two claims.
(I) The existence of a type is a contingent matter, because the existence of a 
type depends on that of its token, and the existence of a token is a contingent 
matter.
(II) There are an infinite number of different triangles, but there are only a 
finite number of the tokens of triangles.
   From these we must conclude that which type of triangle exists is a contingent 
matter. This means that it is a contingent matter whether a certain geometrical objects 
exists or not. Isn't it an absurd conclusion?
7. Geometry is the science of possible types
7.1. From actual to possible
   To this worry, we can answer in the following way. The objects of geometrical 
investigations should not be restricted to the geometrical  types which exist  in  this 
world, namely, those types which are instantiated in this world. Geometry is concerned 
with the totality of possible geometrical types. It seems reasonable to assume that for 
any geometrical type there is some possible world in which its token exists.
    At first sight, this seems to give us a rather bizarre picture. Which type of triangle 
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exists is different in different possible worlds. There is even a possible world in which 
there does not exist any type of geometrical object because it contains nothing that can 
be a token of any geometrical object. 
    However, I don't think this constitutes an objection to our account. In my view, 
geometry aims to establish the truths that hold with any possible type of triangle; and 
in such an enterprise, it does not matter whether a type of triangle exists in the actual  
world or only in some other possible world. 
    According to one well-known story, geometry originated in Egypt where a land 
survey was frequently necessary after the floods of the Nile, and such an origin is 
contained in the word "geometry''  itself. Though I don't know whether there is any 
truth to such a story, it is a reasonable hypothesis that at first geometry was concerned 
with the features of the concrete things like the shapes of lands. In this early phase, the 
objects of geometry were the actual types which were instantiated in the tokens that 
were found in our environment. But, when geometry became a mathematical science,  
its concerns extended from the actual types to all the possible types. 
   Suppose  there  is  a  certain  discipline  that  is  concerned  with  some empirical  
phenomena.  For  such  a  discipline,  one  way of  going  mathematical  is  to  consider 
systematically  all  the  possible  varieties  of  the  phenomena  whether  they  are 
encountered in reality or not. For example, linguistics is supposed to be an empirical 
science that is concerned with all the languages that once existed in the past, exist in 
the present, or will exist in the future. Still, it is concerned with only actual languages. 
Although "mathematical linguistics'' means in reality various things now, it might have 
been used to indicate a discipline that  tries to give a systematic account of all  the 
possible languages whether  they are real  or  not.  The same thing can be said with 
geometry;  if  geometry  is  a  mathematical  discipline  as  we  think  nowadays,  it  is  
concerned with the totality of possible types, including those merely possible types 
which do not have tokens in our world.
   Thus, geometry is not bound to some particular possible world like the actual 
world.  For,  it  is  concerned  with  any  object  existing  in  some  possible  world.  A 
geometrical  object  need not  exist  in all  possible worlds.  It  may not exist  in  some 
possible world. Hence, a geometrical object is not a necessary being in the sense that it  
exists in all possible worlds. I think this is a rather welcome consequence, because 
there is something fishy in the idea of an object existing in all the possible worlds.
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7.2. On the idea of an object which exists in all possible worlds
    What is wrong with such an idea? It is because those things which are supposed 
to exist in all the possible worlds are often abstract entities like properties and numbers 
and they do not seem to contribute anything to the "worldliness'' of the world. In other 
words, they do not seem to be the kind of things whose existence is essential to the 
existence of a world. 
    In general, a property P is said to be an essential property of an object a, when the 
following holds.
  (1) If a does not have P, then a does not exist.
  Or,  
  (1') If a loses the property P, then a ceases to exist.
It  seems that the existence of numbers is an essential property of the world in this 
sense. For, it is usually thought that the following is true.
  (2) If there is no numbers in the world w, then w does not exist.
But, why do we think that (2) is true? The only reason to do so is that it is widely  
believed the antecedent of (2) is necessarily false. However, isn't it obvious that the 
truth of (2) has nothing to do with the nature or essence of a world. Moreover, it is  
well known that there is a philosopher who asserts the truth of the antecedent of (2) 
(Field  1980).  Does  such  a  philosopher  conclude  that  our  world  does  not  exist? 
Obviously not. Thus, there would be no reason to believe (2).
    The situation might be different with a god or the God. If you believe in such a 
being, then you may also believe the following.
  (3) If there is no god in the world w, then w does not exist.
    Why does it seem plausible to someone who believes in a god? She might hold 
that the world is created by the god and hence the existence of the god is necessary for 
the world to exist. But, if she also believes that it is impossible for anything to create 
itself, then she will conclude that the god cannot be a part of the world which it created 
and the god should exist outside of all the possible worlds.
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    Or, she might believe that the world is kept existing by the god. There seems to 
be no absurdity in holding something is kept existing by its part. But it is  an entirely 
different matter whether there is any good reason to believe that the existence of the 
world is necessarily tied up with the existence of a god in that world.
    There is another reason to be suspicious of the idea that there are some objects 
which exist in all possible worlds. It seems to make sense to ask the question "Why is  
there anything rather than nothing?'' as many philosophers have done. But, if there are 
anything which exists in all possible worlds, then such a question is ill-posed because 
its presupposition is false. Of course, we cannot be sure that this traditional question 
really makes sense. For, there are many questions which seemed to make sense on the 
surface but turns out to be nonsense. 
   Or, the question does make sense and it asks whether the totally empty world is  
possible as far as we know. In that case the question presupposes only an epistemic 
possibility of  the world which contains  absolutely nothing.  If  we could find some 
substantial  argument  against  such  a  possibility,  that  would  be  an  interesting 
philosophical discovery. But, if we say that there is no such absolutely empty world 
because  numbers  and  properties  exist  in  all  possible  worlds,  that  will  be  a  
disappointingly uninteresting response.
   Why do we suppose that geometrical objects exist in all possible worlds (although 
I believe that a similar argument can be advanced for mathematical objects in general,  
my present discussion is concerned only with geometrical objects)? I believe that it is 
because we suppose the following three statements are true.
  (4)  There  are  geometrical  statements  which  assert  the  existence  of 
geometrical objects.
  (5) Geometrical statements are necessarily true.
  (6) If a statement is necessarily true, then it is true in all possible worlds.
It must be easy to see how we come to believe that geometrical objects exist in all 
possible worlds if we suppose these three statements are true. 
    What is wrong with such an argument? I claim that if the meaning of "necessarily 
true'' is defined in terms of possible worlds as in (6) then geometrical statements are 
not "necessarily true''.
    As I said before, geometry is concerned with all possible types. It is concerned 
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with any geometrical type which exists in any of the possible worlds. It is not much 
interested in whether some geometrical types exist throughout all the possible worlds,  
because it is very likely there are no such types; for, there might be some possible 
worlds which contain nothing that  can be a token of a geometrical  type. Hence, a 
geometrical truth is not something which is true in all possible worlds; rather it is a 
truth which transcends them in the sense that the domain of geometrical consideration 
is not restricted to any one of them but the sum total of the domains of all the possible 
worlds.
7.3. "A geometrically perfect world''?
    We have claimed that geometry is concerned with all possible types. Then, in 
order to see whether a certain triangle type is possible or not, we have to search for a  
possible world which contains its token throughout the totality of the possible worlds. 
Or, so it seems. Isn't there, however, a possible world in which all the possible triangle 
types have their tokens. Of course, we know that our world is not such a world, but if  
there were a world where some intellectual and immortal beings constantly engage in 
geometrical activities on a planet in the everlasting physical universe, there would be a 
token  for  each  of  the  infinitely different  triangles.  So,  instead  of  considering  the 
totality of possible worlds, it might be enough to consider a single possible world in 
which all geometrical types have their tokens.
    We may say that here is at least another solution to our problem of type existence. 
This is also an alternative way to conceive the ideal nature of geometry. At any case, 
our account that has recourse to the totality of possible worlds is only a picture. Some 
might object that even the everlasting geometrical activity may not produce all the 
necessary tokens. But whether such an objection applies or not depends on how such a 
"geometrically complete'' world is conceived. Considering the whole extent of possible 
worlds does not automatically solve a similar problem, either. If we wish to be sure  
that  the  totality of  possible  worlds  offers  us  enough tokens  for  our  geometry,  we 
should think hard  about  several  things,  starting from the total  number of  possible 
worlds. 
    Now we have two ways to cope with the problem of type existence. According to 
one,  the  geometry  in  the  sense  of  mathematical  geometry  is  concerned  with  any 
possible  geometrical  types  whether  they  have  tokens  in  the  actual  world  or  not.  
According to another, geometrical truths are actual truths in a geometrically perfect 
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world. However, the latter claim is stronger than the claim that geometrical truths are 
truths holding with respect to all possible types. For example, let us suppose for the 
moment that the following is a geometrical truth.
  (*) For any circle, there is a larger circle with the same center.
   According to our original account, (*) is paraphrased thus.
(*1) For any circle type C, if there is a world w such that C exists in w, then  
there is a circle type C' and a world w' such that C and C' exist in w' and C' is  
a larger circle than C and has the same center as C.
If we cash out what the existence of a type means, then (*1) comes to
(*1') For any circle type C, if there is a world w such that C has a token in w,  
then there is a circle type C' and a world w' such that C and C' have their  
tokens in w' and C' is a larger circle than C and has the same center as C.
   In contrast to these, the alternative account interprets (*) in the following way.
(*2) There is a possible world G such that there exists a circle type in G and 
for any circle type C in G there is in G a larger circle type C' with the same 
center as C in G.
which is the same as the following. 
(*2') There is a possible world G such that there exists a circle type in G and 
for any circle type C in G there is in G a token of a circle type C' which is 
larger than C and has with the same center as C.
(*1) is a weaker claim than (*2) because (*1) follows from (*2) but the converse does  
not hold. In particular, if you accept (*2), then you should commit to the existence of a 
possible world which contains an infinite number of circle tokens with different sizes; 
(*1) does not implicate you in such a commitment; it still commits us to the existence 
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of an infinite number of circle tokens with different sizes, but they need not exist in a 
single  world;  they may be  distributed  to  the  whole  universe  consisting  of  all  the 
possible worlds.
   In short, we may conclude that there are no reasons to favor the alternative account 
to our original account. First, there is no positive reason to believe that there exists a 
geometrically possible world. Second, there is no need to believe in such a world in 
order to account for the existence of the possible but not actual geometrical types.
8. How do we know a certain geometrical type is possible?
8.1. The limits of perceptual imagination
    Now, a fundamental question is this: how do we know that a certain geometrical 
type is a possible one? Or,  how do we know that  there is a possible world which 
contains its token, if we do not have any real token of that type?
   Of course, if we have some concrete drawing or picture which shows us what a 
type is, we have actually its token and we know that the type is possible. So the cases  
we should consider are those in which we have only a description of a purported type 
of  geometrical  nature.  How  do  we  know  that  it  is  a  possible  description  of  a 
geometrical type? If we can produce its token according to the description, then we 
know that it has a token and hence is a possible type. But, if we don't or can't do such a  
thing, how do we know that it can have a token? 
   The problem is concerned with the possible existence of an entity with some 
specification. What sort of entity should it be? As we have emphasized, a token is a 
concrete being that exists at a particular time and place, in contrast to a type which is 
abstract and does not exist in space and time. Hence, a token of a geometrical type 
should be a physical object or some of its physical features.
   Let us take up the proposition (*) of the previous section. Why do we think this  
proposition is true? How are we going to justify it?
   Suppose that we draw a circle on a paper. How can we be sure that there is another 
circle which is larger than it and has the same center? We might draw such a circle on 
the same paper. But, suppose that the circle we drew filled the entire paper and there is 
no room for another circle. We may imagine that the paper were a little larger than as it  
actually  is  and  that  there  were  another  circle  that  is  larger  than  the  first  one.  In 
Ohmori's terminology, we have formed a thought of possible perception of a pair of  
concentric circles. Alternatively, in a possible world talk, we have imagined a possible  
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world w which is the same as our world except that it contains a paper that is a little  
larger than the actual one and has two concentric circles on it. 
   Let us consider the larger of the two concentric circles. If (*) is true, then there  
must be another possible token of the still larger circle. We can easily imagine that 
there were another circle drawn on the same paper as the one in w or on some different 
paper which is larger than the paper in w. What we have done this time is to imagine a 
possible world w' which is different from our actual world and also from w.
    Can we go on in this way to verify the truth of (*)? The answer is obviously "no''. 
In some point, we have to consider an object which is too big to be perceived as a  
whole. Then, we can imagine at most only a part of a circle. But how do we know that 
what we have imagined is a part of a circle? If a circle is of cosmic size, what we 
imagine as a part of its circumference will not be distinguished from what we imagine 
as a part of some straight line.
    When we are asked whether some geometrical type can have a token, we usually 
try to answer it by seeing whether we can draw a figure or find a middle-sized object  
with the specified shape. In such cases, we can be reasonably sure that it has a token if 
we can perceptually imagine an object which agrees with the specification given in the 
description of the type. 
   Of course, we sometimes misperceive the shape of an object just as we sometimes 
misidentify a speech sound or a letter. The fact that the object of our perception is an  
abstract object does not exclude the possibility of perceptual mistakes. It is possible to  
have an illusion about abstract objects; we think that we are perceiving a circle when 
we are looking at a many sided polygon. It is also possible to have a hallucination of 
them; when we think that we are perceiving a token of some complex geometrical  
object, there cannot be such a geometrical object in reality; if you want an example,  
then you can find them in many of Escher's drawings; they are full of things which are  
purported to be the tokens of such impossible geometrical objects.
    Hence, the fact that we can perceptually imagine something which meets the 
description of a type does not give a conclusive evidence that there can be its token.  
But it gives us at least a  prima facie reason to suppose that it is a possible type. In 
sum, when we try to see whether a given description of a type can have a token, we  
rely on some principle like the following.
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(P) It is true in most cases that if we perceptually imagine an object which  
satisfies  a  description D,  then D is  a  description of  a  physically possible 
entity.
    But,  if  we wish to  consider  how the things stand in general,  we should be 
prepared to encounter the situations which are beyond our perceptual capacities. As 
our power of imagination goes only as far as our perceptual ability, in such situation, 
we can not make use of the principle like (P) to see whether a given description is one 
of a physically possible object. 
    The things and events of cosmic scales are often beyond our perceptual and 
imaginative powers. Similarly, our perception and imagination fail us with respect to 
extremely small things and what is happening among them. Consider the following 
proposition which is similar to (*).
  (**) For any circle, there is a smaller circle with the same center.
It is obvious that the truth of (**) cannot be ascertained by perception and imagination 
alone, if (**) implies that for any physically possible token of a circle there is another  
physically possible token of a smaller circle.
8.2. Geometry as a part of a physical theory
    These are the cases where our thoughts of possible perceptions are of no use to 
see whether something is physically possible. What should we do then? What do we 
have in order to judge something is physically possible besides our limited power of 
imagination?  An evident  answer is  that  we have a  physical  theory to  tell  whether 
something is physically possible or not, that is, we should adopt a principle like this.
(T) If T is a true physical theory and the existence of D does not contradict  
with T, then D is a description of a physically possible entity.
    Although  this  is  a  most  straightforward  way to  determine  whether  a  given 
description is that of a physically possible entity, there seems to be a problem if the 
description in question is purported to be that of a geometrical type. For, it seems that  
any physical theory requires to account for the spatial structure of our universe, and 
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hence, a system of geometry is an essential part of any physical theory. 
    Now, the path we have followed seems to be a very curious one. We started with 
the observation that the existence of a geometrical type depends on that of its tokens,  
which should be physical  in nature.  If  we wish to show some geometrical  type is 
possible,  we should somehow demonstrate  that  its  token is  physically possible.  In 
everyday context, it can be done by imagining possible perceptions of such a token. 
However,  this  method  does  not  work  at  all  in  the  cases  which  are  beyond  our 
perceptual and imaginary capacities. So, finally we made an appeal to a true physical 
theory as the ultimate arbiter of the physical possibility. But, here we face a surprising 
turn of events, which is that in making an appeal to a physical theory we are also 
making an appeal to a system of geometry which is a part of the theory. It seems that  
we have come back to our starting point  after all.  And, doesn't  this mean that  we 
should possess the knowledge of what geometrical truths are in order to acquire that  
very same knowledge?
    If you think that our account is circular in this way, then it is because I have not 
yet told a fuller story. As a matter of fact, I am going to literally tell a story. It is a 
fictionalized story of how our geometrical knowledge might have developed from a 
humble origin to a highly sophisticated discipline.
   Our interests  in  geometry must  have  originated with the various  but 
recurring shapes of the objects surrounding us. Through such experiences and 
perhaps  owing to our innate capacity,  we acquire  the ability to  recognize 
various  geometrical  types  and  talk about  them. In  this  early stage  of  the 
development,  geometry is  concerned with only actual  types,  that  is,  those 
types which have actual tokens. But, it should not be very difficult to extend 
our geometrical beliefs to possible types by having the thoughts of possible 
perceptions of possible tokens of them. Still, it  is fragmentary and lacks a 
systematic  character.  For  one  thing,  we cannot  form any definite  thought 
about the figures  which are too large or too small  for  our perceptual  and 
imaginative ability. Hence, the next step is to organize various geometrical 
beliefs we came to have into a certain system. It is widely believed that the 
Greeks invented the axiomatic method to do just this.
   Once we have a system of geometry, it became a tool to give a systematic  
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description of the space we are in. Thus, it  forms an essential  part  of our 
physical  theory.  Although  the  system of  geometry  now covers  the  entire 
physical  universe  from the extremely small  to  the  extremely big,  it  must 
agree with our everyday experience with the shapes of the objects for most of 
the part. In particular, the systematic geometry should agree with most of the 
judgments we make by our perception of those middle-sized objects among 
which  we  find  ourselves.  This  means  that  there  should  not  be  any 
irreconcilable conflicts between the criterion (P) of physical possibility given 
by our perception and the criterion (T) given by a true physical theory.
   I believe there is nothing absurd in such a story, and a similar story can be told  
with many fields of our intellectual activity. A theoretical interest is first aroused by 
everyday observation and after many years of the development the resulting theory is 
used in turn to refine our everyday judgments.
   But, there are some reasons to suspect that the story is not really completed yet, for 
there still remain at least two worries. 
   First, do we have any reason to believe that every geometrical type we encounter 
in geometry has a physically possible token? Although any physically possible world 
is also a geometrically possible world, might not there be a geometrically possible but 
physically impossible world? 
   Secondly,  even  if  we  succeeded  in  arguing  that  geometrical  possibility  and 
physical possibility coincide and that every geometrical type has a physically possible 
token, we could not yet tell which geometrical type is possible. It is because there are a 
number  of  empirically  equivalent  physical  theories  with  different  geometries.  The 
possible geometrical types are different according to different geometries. 
   
   Although they are serious worries for our account of geometry, I believe there is a  
way to respond to them. To do so will lead us to discuss some of the central issues in  
the philosophy of mathematics and that of science. Thus, if we wish to attend to the 
first  worry,  we  should  adopt  a  certain  variety  of  modalism  in  the  philosophy  of 
mathematics originally introduced by (Putnam 1967), while it must be obvious that the 
second  worry  is  very  closely  related  to  the  still  continuing  debates  about 
conventionalism in the philosophy of science. Unfortunately, I don't have a space to 
pursue these issues now. I leave it for another occasion.
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